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DOW CHEMICAL AND CIRAOLO: FOR
GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATORS THE
SKY'S NO LIMIT
The fourth amendment of the Constitution protects the rights of individu-
als to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures."' The traditional
view of the fourth amendment limited the authority of the government to
physically enter an individual's home and rummage through personal papers
and effects.2 However, the advent of modern technology such as the tele-
phone,3 the electronic listening device,4 the wiretap 5 and the electronic
tracking device6 has caused the Court to expand and refine the scope of pro-
tections afforded by the fourth amendment. Reform efforts have focused on
expanding the definition of "search" to include electronic invasion of the
home7 and expansion of the definition of "papers, and effects" to include
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. This proscription of intrusive government behavior has its roots in the Framers' aversion
to the English system of general warrants and writs of assistance permitting the government to
seize without restraint persons or their personal papers. In England, issuance of a general
warrant authorized seizure of unlicensed publications. These warrants permitted search by
anyone anywhere in order to seize the documents. J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1:11
(1982). In early colonial times, the writ of assistance permitted similarly unrestrained searches
of homes. Id. § 1:12. These abusive law enforcement tactics fueled the fourth amendment
restrictions on the scope of search and seizure. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 &
n.21 (1980); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 & n.5 (1969), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967);
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1965). See generally 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures
§ 2 (1952).
2. The literal wording of the fourth amendment established the scope of search as "per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. See Payton, reinforcing the point
that "the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house." 445 U.S. at
590.
3. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also infra notes 99-110 and accom-
panying text.
4. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347; see also infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
5. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928))
(Olmstead had upheld the admission of evidence obtained by a warrantless, physically nonin-
trusive wiretap).
6. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
7. In Karo, the Court treated electronic invasion of the home as it would a physical
intrusion. "For purposes of the [Fourth] Amendment, the result is the same where, without a
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electronic messages.8
General agreement continues that "search" includes a physical ransacking
of the home.9 However, the notion of search without physical intrusion"°
has caused courts to reevaluate other forms of nonelectronic investigation of
homes and activities with the enhanced use of the senses of sight and hear-
ing." Such an expansive definition of search recognizes that the fourth
amendment was intended to protect the privacy of people, not merely the
portals of homes.' 2
The Supreme Court has also interpreted the fourth amendment to expand
its reach to protect people in areas outside of the home such as the curtilage
of the home, '3 a place of business 4 and, finally, any place in which individu-
als secret themselves with a reasonable expectation of privacy.' 5 However,
the scope of freedom decreases as individuals move further outside of the
traditionally recognized area of the home.' 6 For example, the scope of free-
dom from unreasonable searches and seizures narrows in places of business' 7
warrant, the Government surreptitiously employs an electronic device to obtain information
that it could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house." Id. at
715.
8. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-11
(1961) (Court excluded testimony as to conversations overheard by officers using a physically
intrusive electronic listening device without first having obtained a warrant).
9. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also infra note 138 and accompanying
text.
10. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (eavesdropping on conversations within phone booth
using exterior listening device held to be a search).
11. Courts have held that searches accomplished by auditory observation with a wiretap
or visual observation with a telescope without physical penetration of the four walls which
comprise a home are unreasonable. See id. (overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928), which held that recordings of wiretapped telephone conversations were admissible
because the government tapped phone lines without physical entry); see, e.g., United States v.
Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976) (held unreasonable to use a telescope to view interior
of a home); see also infra note 207 and accompanying text.
12. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (fourth amendment protections extend to some areas of
public access); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984). The Karo Court
stated: "A 'search' occurs 'when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable is infringed.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
13. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). Curtilage is defined as "the land
immediately surrounding and associated with the home." Id. (citations omitted).
14. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (phone booth).
16. See, e.g., infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
17. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981). The privacy interests in com-
mercial property differ from those in homes and are not necessarily infringed by warrantless
administrative inspections. Id. See generally J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
AccUSED: PRETRIAL RIGHTS § 59 (1972). Thus, expectations of privacy are not homoge-
nous, and the degree of protection necessary to preserve them can vary with the circumstances.
See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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and is nonexistent in open fields.18 Recently, the Supreme Court further
restricted freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures in terms of the
place of intrusion. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States19 and California v.
Ciraolo,20 the Supreme Court permitted warrantless aerial surveillance of
exterior commercial21 and residential22 property despite the fact that ground
level entry would have required a warrant.23
This exception to the fourth amendment provided the government with an
alternative to obtaining a warrant in order to view what a property owner
enclosed at ground level.24 It is more convenient and less expensive to con-
ceal activities from ground level observation with a fence than from over-
head observation through use of domes or enclosures.25 In a sense, these
recent decisions signal an important narrowing of the protection of privacy,
moving individuals and businesses back within the confines of their buildings
and transforming all other areas into "open fields" where fourth amendment
protections do not apply.26 On the other hand, the decisions are philosoph-
ically consistent with prior expansion of fourth amendment protection.27
This Comment will identify the competing doctrines of fourth amendment
protection as established by the physical trespass and reasonable expectation
of privacy definitions of search. The Court's adoption of the reasonable
expectation of privacy doctrine expanded the scope of fourth amendment
protection, but provided a less mechanical guideline for government investi-
gators seeking to avoid the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. Ex-
amination of the Dow Chemical and Ciraolo decisions' narrowing of the
fourth amendment's boundaries reveals an apparent contradiction in trends.
The decisions arguably retreat to a physical trespass formulation of search.
Yet, these decisions are compatible with the prior guidelines established
within the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine. It seems unlikely that
18. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) ("There is no societal interest in
protecting the privacy of those activities ... that occur in open fields.").
19. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
20. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
21. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
22. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
23. See Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1826; Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
24. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
25. Id. at 1828 n. I (Powell, J., dissenting). Wrongdoers will be limited in their ability to
conceal illegitimate activities from this new government vantage point in the skies. See
Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812 (opinion by Burger, C.J.). In addition, other property owners may
find it oppressive to keep private legitimately concealed uses of their facilities or yards. Id. at
1819 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting); Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1828 n.1 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
26. See Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1819 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
27. See infra notes 238-302 and accompanying text.
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the course of fourth amendment analysis will be altered by Dow Chemical
and Ciraolo, however, the decisions may have significant impact on individu-
als and businesses seeking to enjoy the unobserved use of their exterior prop-
erty. Finally, this Comment will predict the consequences of this refinement
of fourth amendment doctrine.
I. PARAMETERS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
Historically, the protections of the fourth amendment began at the doors
of residences, making the home a castle isolated from unreasonable govern-
ment intrusion without a warrant based upon probable cause and issued by a
neutral and detached magistrate.28 In order to deter abuse of the search by
law enforcement authorities,29 the Court developed the exclusionary rule.3"
The advancement of technology in the field of communication decreased
our reliance on the letter as a primary expression of thoughts and ideas and
increased our reliance on the communication of thoughts by telephone.31
The use of the telephone eventually led to the interpretation of the fourth
amendment as protecting electronic communication as well as one's "pa-
28. The sanctity of the home has traditionally received fourth amendment protection. See
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714, 718 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589,
601 (1980); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971), overruled, Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1
(1982); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129, 137 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967). The warrant and probable cause requirements are embodied in the fourth amendment.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The requirement of issuance by a detached and neutral magistrate is
found in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). These prerequisites for a valid
search protect the underlying fourth amendment value of preventing arbitrary government
invasions. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
29. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (deterrence was the objective of the exclu-
sionary rule), overruled on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruled on
other grounds, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
30. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643 (extending the exclusionary rule to the states through the four-
teenth amendment), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (applying the exclusionary rule to federal courts),
overruled on other grounds, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). This rule prohibits
the introduction in court of substantive evidence obtained by an unreasonable, warrantless
search conducted without a prior finding of probable cause by a neutral and detached magis-
trate or not included in a warrant exception. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. But see Leon, 468
U.S. at 926 (officers' good faith reliance on the technical sufficiency of the search warrant
issued by a magistrate is an exception to the requirement of probable cause for search); J.
HALL, supra note 1, at § 23:7 (illegally seized evidence may be admissible for impeachment
purposes).
31. See Petitioner's Argument, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 444 (1928)
("Under modern conditions the telephone has, to a large extent, supplanted the mails as a
means of transmitting private messages."), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
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pers."' 2 This development resulted in redefinition of the word "search." It
came to mean more than the physical trespass in a private place. "Search"
evolved to include electronic intrusion3 3 into areas in which individuals pos-
sessed a reasonable expectation of privacy.34 An expanded zone of privacy
has encompassed curtilage, 35 commercial property,36 and places of public
access such as the phone booth. 7 However, the scope of privacy in such
areas differs.3 8
A. The Physical Trespass Doctrine
The fourth amendment expressly protects the privacy of the home from
unwarranted governmental intrusions.39 Initially, the courts defined intru-
sion as a physical trespass on private property.' Subsequent to the develop-
ment of the telephone, technological advances made it possible for law
enforcement authorities to surreptitiously overhear telephone and other pri-
vate communications without physical interference with the home.4 Early
decisions upheld electronic intrusions into conversations within the fourth
amendment based on the lack of a physical trespass in obtaining the infor-
mation and the belief that the fourth amendment did not protect
conversations.
The Court in Olmstead v. United States4 2 upheld the use of evidence ob-
32. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
34. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967); see also infra notes 94-110 and
accompanying text.
35. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
36. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541,
543 (1967); see also Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981).
37. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. In particular, the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy diminishes in commercial property compared with residential property because
of strong, legitimate government interests served by a more flexible approach to such searches.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text. While the Court in See v. City of Seattle upheld a
warrant requirement for certain administrative searches of business property, 387 U.S. at 545,
a less stringent showing of probable cause has been required to obtain an administrative search
warrant. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967); see Donovan, 452 U.S. at
598. Under certain circumstances the Court has upheld warrantless inspection of commercial
property. These exceptions to the warrant requirement have involved pervasively regulated
industries. See, e.g., Donovan, 452 U.S. at 594 (underground and surface mine safety inspec-
tions); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (inspection of gun dealers); Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (inspections of liquor licensees' premises).
The need for flexibility to protect strong government interests is analyzed in Donovan. 452
U.S. at 602-03.
39. See supra notes 2, 28 and accompanying text.
40. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
41. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 508-09 (1961).
42. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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tained by warrantless wiretapping as not being a search or seizure in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment.43 In Olmstead, the government relied on
wiretaps effected without entry of defendants' homes or businesses.' The
Olmstead Court defined search as a "physical invasion.., for the purpose of
making a seizure."4 Thus, the Court found significant the lack of a physical
entry by government investigators.46 It distinguished the tapping of wires
within a residence from tapping mere feet away at the street4 7 on the basis
that the citizen who projects his voice over the phone lines assumes the risk
that another will hear what is said.48
Justice Butler's dissent in Olmstead called for a less literal interpretation
of the phrase search and seizure.49 Focusing alternatively on the parties'
exclusive use of the phone lines, the dissent considered this to be analogous
to property in that the parties' use should be preserved without interference
by government.5' The search in such circumstances was the government's
act of tapping and listening for evidence.51 This liberal reading of the fourth
amendment relied on the prior discredited holding in Boyd v. United States 2
that a search and seizure could be effected without physical invasion.53
Justice Brandeis, also dissenting in Olmstead, argued that the Constitution
ought to be interpreted in light of modern circumstances rather than being
43. Id. at 466.
44. Id. at 457 (taps located at street or in basement of large commercial office building).
45. Id. at 466. The Court in Olmstead distinguished the trespass in an open field in Hester
v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), from trespass in a home or curtilage based on a literal
reading of the fourth amendment's language protecting homes from unreasonable searches.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465-66.
46. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
47. See id. at 465.
48. Id. at 464, 466. Additionally, the Court focused on the government's mere reliance on
the sense of hearing which could not be characterized as a seizure. As the Court indicated, the
Constitution could not be applied so as to "forbid hearing or sight." Id at 465. Thus, the
Court in Olmstead concluded that conversations were not protected by the fourth amendment
because their inclusion would bar investigators' reliance on their ordinary senses. Id.
The Court indicated that the proscription of wiretapping would need to be established by
congressional act rather than constitutional authority. Id. at 465-66. Congress passed title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802,
82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982)) to regulate government
wiretaps. For a description of the provisions of the Act, see generally 11 E. SMITH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 40.85a (3d ed. 1980).
49. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 488 (Butler, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 487.
51. Id.
52. 116 U.S. 616 (1886), overruled, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), overruled,
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), overruled, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463
(1976).
53. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 487 (Butler, J., dissenting) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886).
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reduced to time-bound formulas such as physical trespass.54 In particular,
he objected to a formulation that would ignore new and subtler forms of
investigation capable of breaching the security of one's privacy without the
breaking and entering of its confines.55 Thus, Justice Brandeis abhorred
"every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed."56
In Goldman v. United States,57 the Court revisited the Olmstead case. In
Goldman, the Court upheld the use of a physically nonintrusive detecta-
phone to overhear conversations between defendant co-conspirators and an
informant to violate the Bankruptcy Act.5" The defendants attempted to
suppress the evidence obtained on the grounds that the agents had overheard
one side of a telephone conversation in violation of the federal wiretapping
provisions.59 In addition, they challenged the introduction of the evidence
because use of the detectaphone had been preceded by a warrantless entry of
the defendant's office that resulted in the placement of a defective spike
mike.6° Finally, the defendants attempted to distinguish the facts from those
in Olmstead.61
These arguments failed. The Court distinguished overhearing one side of
a telephone conversation from the interception of a call in transmission
through phone lines, the former occurring without interference with the
phone lines.62 Additionally, the Court upheld the use of the detectaphone
despite a prior warrantless entry because the device that produced the evi-
dence did not require the prior entry in order to operate.63 Finally, the
Court reaffirmed Olmstead by stating that the two factual contexts could not
be distinguished.64 The Court thus rejected an opportunity to protect pri-
54. Id. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 473-75.
56. Id. at 478.
57. 316 U.S. 129 (1942), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
58. Id. at 130-31, 133-34.
59. See id. at 134.
60. Id. at 134-35.
61. The defendant argued that whereas the Court in Olmstead found that communication
over telephone wires evidenced an intent to communicate beyond one's home, in Goldman, the
defendant had intended his speech to be communicated only within the confines of his home.
Id. at 135.
62. Id. at 135.
63. Id. at 134-35. The Court admitted that had the spike mike worked, evidence obtained
from its use would have been excluded under the physical trespass theory. Id. Such facts were
presented in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). See infra notes 71-78 and ac-
companying text.
64. Goldman, 316 U.S. at 135 ("[N]o reasonable or logical distinction can be drawn be-
tween what federal agents did in the present case and state officers did in the Olmstead case.").
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vacy because Goldman had no intent to project his voice beyond his office.65
The Court failed to explain its finding that one who speaks to another inside
his office has assumed the risk that government agents are listening via a
well-placed listening device. 66
Justice Murphy dissented echoing the Brandeis dissent in Olmstead by
concluding that the requirement of a physical entry and ransacking was too
literal an interpretation of the Constitution.67 Like Justice Brandeis, 68 Jus-
tice Murphy expressed the view that Olmstead permitted technological in-
trusion without physical entry. 69 He likened the confidentiality of a
communication intended for those within one's office to the confidentiality of
a written message and criticized the Court's view that only the latter was a
constitutionally protected expression by virtue of its having been recorded
on paper.7°
Reinforcing the physical trespass doctrine in Silverman v. United States,7
the Court unanimously reversed convictions obtained through use of a spike
mike inserted into the wall of the defendant's home.72 The police lodged the
mike up against the duct system of the petitioner's home enabling the officers
to overhear conversations throughout the house.7 3 The petitioner argued
that modern technology permitted highly intrusive electronic listening with-
out physical invasion of the home, but the Court sidestepped the issue of
nonphysical intrusion.74 Instead, the Court overturned the convictions be-
cause the mike had physically penetrated the petitioner's dwelling.75 Thus,
the Court clarified Olmstead and Goldman as having defined search as a
physical entry.7 6
In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas indicated that he would find a
fourth amendment violation whenever the government invades the intimacy
65. Id.; see J. HALL, supra note 1, at § 2:2.
66. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled, Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
67. Goldman, 316 U.S. at 138 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (fourth amendment protections
need not be maintained at levels existing at the inception of the amendment).
68. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see supra notes 54-56 and
accompanying text.
69. Goldman, 316 U.S. at 139 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 141.
71. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
72. Id. at 512.
73. Id. at 506-07.
74. Id. at 508-09. Petitioners described devices capable of picking up conversations from
a distance without entry of the dwelling or room. The Court, however, indicated that evalua-
tion of those devices would involve facts not relevant in Silverman. Id.
75. Id. at 509, 512.
76. Id. at 510-12.
[Vol. 36:667
Aerial Surveillance
of a home, regardless of a physical entry.7 7 He asserted that the privacy of
the home, not the structure of the home, had been compromised by the war-
rantless activity of the police in Silverman.75
Thus, through Silverman the Court maintained that the fourth amend-
ment protected the structure and tangible contents of a home, but not neces-
sarily the intangible communication, by itself, of those within it, from the
physical intrusion of government searches. Contemporaneous with this
view, dictum and dissent developed an alternative definition of search which
focused on the concept of privacy rather than property.
B. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine
While the Olmstead, Goldman, and Silverman cases established the physi-
cal trespass doctrine of search, dissenting opinions in those cases and dicta in
others79 developed the doctrine which eventually supplanted the physical
entry test of search. Boyd v. United States"0 first emphasized the nonphysi-
cal aspects of search.8' In Boyd, the Court held unconstitutional, under the
fourth and fifth amendments, a statute requiring one accused of customs
violations to produce documents pertaining to the matter or to admit the
alleged content of the documents.8 2 During the trial, the district attorney
obtained an order requiring the defendant to produce an invoice for previous
imports.8 3 The defendant complied but protested that the order was uncon-
stitutional and void because it compelled production of evidence in violation
of the fourth and fifth amendments.84 The trial court admitted the evidence
over defendant's objections.85 The Supreme Court concluded that the fourth
amendment proscribed compelled production despite the lack of a search or
seizure because the law achieved the same result as a forced entry and
search.86 The Court emphasized that the Constitution protected against the
indignity of the violation of privacy and not merely the physical intrusion of
77. Id. at 512-13 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas contended:
Yet the invasion of privacy is as great in one case as in the other. The concept of "an
unauthorized physical penetration into the premises," on which the present decision
rests, seems to me to be beside the point .... There is in each such case a search that
should be made, if at all, only on a warrant issued by a magistrate.
Id.
78. Id. at 513.
79. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
80. 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see infra note 89.
81. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630; see also infra note 87.
82. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638.
83. Id. at 618.
84. See id. at 618, 621.
85. Id. at 618.
86. Id. at 621-22.
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the home.17 The Court excluded the evidence, finding the defendant had
been given no alternative but "to be a witness against himself" in violation
of the fifth amendment's proscription of compelled self-incrimination. 8
Although Boyd was later reversed, 9 the dissent by Justice Brandeis in
Olmstead echoed Boyd's conclusion that the fourth amendment protected
privacy rather than property.90 Thus, Justice Brandeis' focus centered on
the invasion regardless of "the means employed." 9 Justice Murphy's dis-
sent in Goldman similarly emphasized the intrusion whether physical or
technological. 92 Justice Douglas, in his Silverman concurrence, reinforced
this viewpoint when he stated that he would have favored suppression of the
evidence collected by agents in Silverman, whether or not the device used
had penetrated the wall of the defendant's home, because it intruded on de-
fendant's privacy. 93
These concerns that the fourth amendment protected against more than
mere trespasses by the government took legal effect in Katz v. United
States.94 In Katz, the Court defined search as that which invaded a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy. 95 The Katz Court held "the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places."' 96 Government observation of voluntarily
disclosed activities could not constitute a search because disclosure frus-
87. Id. at 630.
The principles laid down in [Lord Camden's] opinion affect the very essence of con-
stitutional liberty and security .... (T]hey apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes
the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been for-
feited by his conviction of some public offence, it is the invasion of this sacred right
which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment.
Id. Boyd was the first case to set out search and seizure law under the fourth amendment
although it involved neither a search nor a seizure. It was a fifth amendment case. See Olm-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 440 (1928), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); see also infra note 90 and accompanying text.
88. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35.
89. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. For a criticism of the Boyd decision, see
Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 335, 346 (1978).
The Court relied on Boyd in Gouled to hold that search warrants could not be used to search a
man's home for incriminating evidence. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
That conlusion was overruled in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1967).
90. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
94. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
95. Id. at 353.
96. Id. at 351.
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trated the maintenance of privacy.97 The Court further recognized that
"what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected."9' Katz challenged the FBI's at-
tachment of a listening device to the outside of a phone booth to overhear his
transmission of wagering information.99 The Court suppressed the evidence
obtained, reasoning that one who enters a pay phone booth does not assume
the risk that he will be overheard."°° The Court recognized that the public
phone system had become a means of private communication.10 Thus, the
placing of a listening device on the outside of a phone booth, rather than
within its enclosure, had no constitutional significance.' 0 2 In the absence of
a valid search warrant, Katz's telephone conversation could not be
overheard. 103
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Katz, posited the formulation
that replaced the physical trespass definition of search. "° He developed a
two-prong test to establish a search: (1) the person must have displayed his
intention to keep the thing, communication or behavior private and (2) the
intention must be legitimate. 105 Thus, Katz recognized as a threat to fourth
amendment protections "electronic as well as physical intrusion. '106 By ap-
plying the two-prong test in his analysis of Katz, Justice Harlan concluded
that government investigators had violated a legitimate expectation of pri-
97. Id.
98. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
99. See id. at 348.
100. Id. at 352. It is interesting to speculate as to the continued legitimacy of expectations
of privacy in phone booths since telephone companies have replaced the booth with open air
kiosks. Use of a public phone may no longer satisfy the Katz test when no door shuts out "the
uninvited ear." See id.
101. Id. This conclusion mirrored the dissenting opinions by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled, Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Justice Murphy in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129, 136-42 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), which called for a more liberal reading of the Constitution. Id. at 138; Olmstead, 277
U.S. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
102. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
103. Id. at 358-59.
104. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
762 n.9 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
105. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 360. Justice Harlan concluded:
Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are
not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On
the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being over-
heard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasona-
ble. Cf Hester v. United States, [265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924)].
Id. at 361.
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vacy. 10 7 Katz had expressed his intention to maintain privacy because he
spoke within the booth's enclosure rather than in the open air. 10 Addition-
ally, Katz established the reasonableness of this expectation because he had
made use of a temporarily private area to convey his message.'° 9 Thus, Katz
replaced the physical trespass definition of search with a privacy
definition. 110
C. Applications of the Katz Two-Prong Test
The Court has applied the definition of search espoused by Justice Harlan
in Katz in a number of contexts since its initial promulgation.' 11 However,
the test has not evolved to the point of providing law enforcement officers
with a "bright-line rule" as to when their proposed actions constitute a
search under the fourth amendment.112 Instead, courts have examined all of
the circumstances to determine the existence of a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 13
In examining various applications of the reasonable expectation of privacy
test, certain common factors have emerged in case law to aid in predicting
the most probable fourth amendment treatment of various government in-
vestigation practices. These factors aid either in meeting the first threshold
requirement that the target of the search objectively manifest an actual ex-
pectation of privacy 1 4 or the second requirement that the expectation be
justifiable. 15 The Harlan formulation requires that both prongs of the test
be satisfied to conclude that the government conducted a search.' 1 6
Factors tending to establish that the target manifested an intent to main-
tain his privacy include the taking of precautions to prevent observation of
the thing or activity 1 7 because in the absence of such actions one has for-
feited his privacy interest by having exposed knowingly the activities to the
107. Id. at 361.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 362. In agreeing that Katz overruled Goldman's statement of the physical tres-
pass doctrine, Justice Harlan maintained: "Its limitation on Fourth Amendment protection is,
in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may
be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion." Id.
111. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 114-58 and accompa-
nying text.
112. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 145-48, 152; see J. HALL, supra note 1, at § 1:1.
113. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152 (Powell, J., concurring).
114. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
115. Id.
116. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see J. HALL, supra note 1, at § 2:15.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (canceled checks); Katz 389
U.S. at 347 (talking on the telephone).
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public." '8 For example, in Katz, the defendant expressed his intention to
keep private the contents of his telephone conversation by drawing shut the
door of the phone booth. 119 Failure to take such precautions may imply that
the target of the search had no actual expectation of privacy in the area. 120
Participation in a public transaction involves intentional display of activities
and documents. The Court had held that cashing checks knowingly re-
vealed to the bank and its employees the canceled checks and other bank
documents. 12' This exposure refuted any assertion of an intent to maintain
the confidentiality of the documents.122 Similarly, placing telephone calls,
even from one's home, revealed those numbers to the phone company and
forfeited any expectation of privacy in those numbers. 123
In addition, maintaining sole dominion and control of a location or thing
may establish the first prong of the Katz test. 124 The target of the search
must do more than assert a property right to exercise sole dominion and
control because mere ownership does not establish an intent to maintain pri-
vacy. 12  In Rakas v. Illinois, 126 passengers in a car claimed standing to pro-
test the admission of evidence seized from the automobile.' 27 The Court
118. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
119. Id.; see also supra note 100.
120. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
121. Miller, 425 U.S. at 435. In Miller, federal agents suspected defendant of distilling
alcohol without a bond in order to defraud the government of tax revenues. Id. at 436. The
agents obtained a grand jury subpoena of the defendant's bank records. Id. at 437. The bank
complied without asking the defendant's consent and, based on the records, the grand jury
indicted the defendant. Id. at 438. The Miller Court found the canceled checks and other
bank documents were not "private papers" of the defendant because he had knowingly ex-
posed them to the bank and its employees, thus forfeiting their confidentiality. Id. at 440
(citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886)). As a result, the defendant had exhib-
ited no actual expectation of privacy in the records. Id. at 442. Since fourth amendment
protections were contingent upon such an expectation, the Court refused to suppress the
records. Id. at 437.
122. Id. at 442.
123. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The police investigated Smith in connection
with a robbery and asked the telephone company to install a pen register to record calls made
from Smith's home. Id. at 737. Smith attempted to suppress the numbers dialed under the
fourth amendment, id., because he had dialed them from his home, a constitutionally pro-
tected area. Id. at 743. The Court rejected this attempt as the pen register revealed only the
numbers dialed, not the content of the calls. Id. at 741. Additionally, the Court held that
Smith had knowingly exposed those numbers to the phone company and, as a result, exhibited
no actual expectation of privacy in them. Id. at 742.
124. See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
125. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978); see also supra note 106 (the target
must deny access to or observation of the item); cf Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149 (power to exclude
all but owner sufficient to create an expectation of privacy).
126. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
127. Id. at 129. The police stopped a car suspected of use to flee the scene of a robbery. Id.
at 130. Search of the automobile revealed rifle shells in the glove compartment and a sawed-off
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held that passengers in an automobile who had not exercised dominion and
control over the items seized or area, i.e., the glove compartment and under
the front seat, could not claim to have suffered a deprivation of fourth
amendment rights.128 In Rawlings v. Kentucky,'29 the defendant attempted
to suppress as evidence drugs seized from the handbag of a companion who
was with him at the time of his arrest.' 30 The Court rejected Rawlings'
assertion of ownership because he had given up sole dominion and control of
the drugs by placing them in the handbag of a recent acquaintance and be-
cause he had knowledge of others' access to her purse. 3 ' In sum, the sub-
ject of the search must have exhibited his actual expectation of privacy in the
area searched in a manner objectively observable by the public.'32
Answering the second Katz question regarding the reasonableness of the
expectation of privacy133 requires a normative analysis.' 34 No single factor
determines the legitimacy of one's expectation.' 35 The Court has, however,
recognized certain historic and modem activities warranting fourth amend-
ment protection. Certainly, the intent of the Framers sets the minimum
boundaries of fourth amendment legitimacy.' 36 The Founding Fathers
clearly established their intent that "houses, papers, and effects"' deserved
rifle under the seat. Id. The passengers were arrested and convicted of armed robbery. Id.
On appeal, the Court refused to suppress the evidence of the search on the grounds that the
passengers lacked standing to make a fourth amendment objection to its admission. Id. at 138.
128. Id. at 149. The passengers made no showing of a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their effort to suppress the evidence seized from the car. Id. The Court stated that, based on
the poor showing of an expectation, the effort to suppress would have failed even if the evi-
dence was seized from them in a house. Id. at 148. The need for a showing of a reasonable
expectation of privacy was emphasized in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-93 (1980).
129. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
130. Id. at 101. Rawlings placed his cache of drugs in the handbag of a female companion
when police approached the house to make an arrest. Id. at 101 n.l.
131. Id. at 104-05. Thus, mere ownership or lack of ownership is not dispositive of the first
prong of the Katz test. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n. 12. As Katz indicated, the protections of
the fourth amendment may be applicable where one has no ownership interest as in a phone
booth. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). As Rawlings illustrated, mere
ownership may not be sufficient either. 448 U.S. at 104-05.
132. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105-06.
133. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
134. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). The Court in Oliver pointed out
that several factors may establish the norms of privacy expectations in our society: (1) the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution; (2) the uses of the location for which protection is
sought; and (3) societal understandings as to what constitutes a "constitutionally protected
area." Id.; see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (criminal's private use of a location is not a
legitimate expectation of privacy). But see Yackle, supra note 89, at 361-62 & n. 192 (fourth
amendment freedoms may be vulnerable when dependent on fluctuating community norms).
135. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152-53 (Powell, J., concurring).
136. See supra note 134.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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protection. 13  The Framers extended this protection by implication to busi-
nesses as the fourth amendment protected "houses" not "dwelling
houses."' 139 This concept of privacy derived from societal commitment to
protection of the innately private activities common to such areas' 40 rather
than from a strict property analysis. 141
In addition to historic recognition of certain privacy interests, modem so-
ciety has acknowledged other private uses of locations and things as reason-
able under the Katz test. For example, the temporary use of a public phone
booth to conduct private communication justified an expectation of privacy
in Katz, 142 despite the fact that other members of the public could make
successive use of the booth. 143 In contrast, certain uses of locations or things
do not merit constitutional protection based on generalizations as to their
use. 1  For example, the Court has categorically rejected the legitimacy of
privacy interests in open fields, as most activities undertaken there are pub-
lic. 45 Their use for private activities such as "lovers' trysts" 146 cannot rebut
138. Even after Katz, the Court has held physical trespass of the home without a warrant
an unreasonable search. In Payton v. New York, the Court held the warrantless entry of a
home in order to make an arrest violative of the Framers' intent to circumscribe all entries of
homes. 445 U.S. 573, 584-86 (1980). Similarly, in Steagald v. United States, the Court held
that police could not search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party
without first obtaining a search warrant. 451 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1981). The Court relied on the
plain wording of the fourth amendment as establishing a requirement of independent judicial
review prior to invasion of a home. Id. at 214 n.7. Finally, in United States v. Karo, the Court
expressed willingness to suppress evidence seized as a result of warrantless monitoring of a can
containing an electronic beeper located within the defendant's home. 468 U.S. 705, 716
(1984). The Court reasoned that homes were legitimately private areas not subject to elec-
tronic monitoring of what could not be visually observed. Id. The evidence in Karo was not
suppressed based on independent probable cause to support a search. Id. at 719-21.
139. See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 19 (1973); 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures
§ 15 (1952); see also Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367 (1968); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 543 (1967).
140. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
141. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 100-01, 108-09 and accompanying text
143. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
144. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
145. Id.; United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983); see; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 144 n.12 (1978); Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865
(1974). In Oliver, state police received a tip that Oliver was raising marijuana. 466 U.S. at
173. While investigating, the police located marijuana in a field near Oliver's home. Id. Oli-
ver objected to use of the evidence seized arguing a legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. The
Court reiterated the conclusions of Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), which
originated the open fields doctrine. 466 U.S. at 178. In reaffirming Hester, the Court con-
cluded that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in a field because a field is not "the
setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from govern-
ment interference or surveillance." Id. at 179. In addition, the Court rejected his precautions
because they did not limit the ability of officers to aerially survey the land. Id. The dicta in
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the presumption that such activities when carried on in an open field are
nevertheless public. 147 Society respects no privacy interest in an open
field. 14' Neither does society recognize an expectation of privacy in aban-
doned property since all privacy interests have been forfeited by the discard
of the item. 149 The Court subjects other places and things to limited fourth
amendment protection by virtue of their visibility150 or countervailing socie-
tal interests.' 5'
In contrast, the Court has presumed that the fourth amendment does pro-
tect activities and things in certain other places.152 The Court has labeled
such presumptively protected places "constitutionally protected areas."' 5
Although this doctrine appears to incorporate property analysis in conflict
with Katz' conclusion that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places,"' 54 in fact, the doctrine stemmed from a combination of the Framers'
intent and modem societal understandings.' 55 In an effort to clarify fourth
amendment doctrine, the Court recognized the legitimacy of privacy inter-
ests in such areas.' 56 This focus minimized the burden on law enforcement
officials to balance, on an ad hoc basis, the individual and societal interests in
protecting privacy.' 57 This analysis has not, however, substituted for the
Oliver seems a clear precursor to the decision in Dow Chemical See infra note 171 and accom-
panying text.
146. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 n.10. But see id. at 192 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (open fields
may be the site of lovers' trysts, worship or solitary walks).
147. Id. at 179 n.10.
148. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
149. See J. HALL, supra note 1, at § 2:9.
150. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 153-54 & n.2 (1978). An outsider's ability to observe the interior of a car diminishes the
reasonableness of expectations of privacy in them. As the Court noted:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal
effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thor-
oughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion). See also G.M. Leasing Corp.
v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1977) (public property).
151. See supra notes 17, 36, 38 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
155. See J. HALL, supra note 1, at § 2:7.'
156. Katz and similar cases have recognized certain areas as constitutionally protected.
See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (curtilage); Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (house); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (phone
booth); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1966) (hotel room); Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253, 262 n.6 (1960) (occupied taxicab); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920) (office).
157. Standards for official determination of the legitimacy of an expectation of privacy
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Katz two-prong test because, as the Court noted in Katz, the constitutionally
protected areas analysis was not "a talismanic solution to every Fourth
Amendment problem."''
Thus, despite the failure of the Court to develop a "bright-line rule" for
defining a search, it has provided certain guidelines enabling law enforce-
ment authorities to determine the need for a warrant prior to investigation.
II. Dow CHEMICAL AND CIRAOLmO" THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION
OF PRIVACY DOCTRINE VIEWED FROM A DIFFERENT
VANTAGE POINT
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States159 and California v. Ciraolo, "60 the
Supreme Court upheld governmental surveillance from public airspace' 6' of
a commercial facility162 and a residential backyard 163 on the grounds that
overflights'" do not constitute a search under the Katz reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy doctrine. 165 In so holding, the Court provided clarification of
both prongs of the Katz definition of search.' 66 Consequently, the Court
must be workable, reasonable and objective. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772-73 (1983).
The Court has expressed its concern that case-by-case approaches may result in arbitrary en-
forcement.. Eg., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181-82. Despite this realization and efforts at simplifying
fourth amendment guidelines for their field application, the fourth amendment remains a con-
fused area of law. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); see also J. HALL, supra note 1, at § 1:1. Hall points out that: "The law of search
and seizure has grown at such a rate and in such a manner that specific, 'easy to apply' rules no
longer exist, if indeed any ever did .... The slightest variation in the facts can alter the
perspective of the question and probably the outcome of the case." Id. But see Yackle, supra
note 89, at 362-63 (fourth amendment doctrine has been developed without reason so as to
undermine constitutional protections).
158. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.9.
159. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). The decision in Dow Chemical was five-to-four. Id. at 1821.
Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion of the Court. Id. Justice Powell wrote the dissenting
opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. The dissenters concurred
in pt. III, id., recognizing EPA's authority to use all available means of enforcement. Id. at
1824.
160. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986). The decision in Ciraolo was also written by Chief Justice
Burger with the same dissenters. Id. at 1810.
161. Eg., Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812; Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1822 (citing 49 U.S.C.
App. § 1304 (1982); 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1985)).
162. The EPA flew over Dow's Midland, Michigan industrial facility. 106 S. Ct. at 1822.
163. Local police flew over Ciraolo's backyard. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1810.
164. In Dow Chemical, the EPA commissioned a private airline to make the overflight of
Dow's plant. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1822. In Ciraolo, the local police sent two officers
trained in marijuana identification in a private plane to fly over Ciraolo's yard. Ciraolo, 106 S.
Ct. at 1810.
165. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1827; Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811-12.
166. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
19871
Catholic University Law Review
relieved law enforcement officials of the warrant requirement 167 even though
a warrant would have been required to make a ground level investigation of
the areas.1 68 These rulings should encourage officials to aerially survey in
order to verify compliance with various health, safety and criminal stat-
utes. 169 The holdings may also stimulate businesses and individuals to take
precautionary measures to prevent aerial observation of their legitimate and
illegitimate activities conducted out of doors. 170
In Dow Chemical, the Supreme Court held that the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency's (EPA) aerial surveillance of Dow Chemical's plant was not
a search under the fourth amendment.17' Dow Chemical owned a 2000 acre
facility in Michigan. The complex's numerous buildings and interconnect-
ing pipework were surrounded by an elaborate security system that barred
ground level public view of the plant.172 In addition, Dow Chemical investi-
gated all low flying planes in order to assure that trade secrets were not
compromised by private photography of the plant. 17' The EPA conducted
an investigation of Dow's Michigan plant in order to ensure compliance with
federal air quality standards.1 74 The EPA then requested reentry for the
purpose of taking photographs of the power plants. 175 Dow refused reentry
based on EPA's intent to take pictures. 176 Instead of obtaining an adminis-
trative warrant to search the plant, EPA contracted with a private firm to fly
over the plant and take mapping photographs of the facility and emis-
sions. 177 The photographs taken were capable of magnification to reveal the
network of connecting pipes visible only from above the plant.' 78 When
Dow Chemical learned of the photographs it brought suit for declaratory
and injunctive relief. 179
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
granted partial summary judgment for Dow Chemical based on its conclu-
167. A court's determination that there was no search under Katz eliminates the warrant
requirement and possible application of the exclusionary rule. See J. HALL, supra note 1, at
§ 2:5.
168. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
171. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
172. Id. at 1822.
173. Id.
174. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. The clarity of the photographs was made possible by use of a $22,000 mapping
camera mounted within the plane. Id. at 1357 n.2.
179. Id.
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sion that EPA had conducted a warrantless search 180 by taking aerial photo-
graphs of Dow's facility. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed."' The Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals deci-
sion, finding the search permissible due to its failure to meet the Katz test. 1
82
The aerial surveillance in California v. Ciraolo 183 was upheld under the
same Katz test. 184 Police received an anonymous tip that Dante Ciraolo was
growing marijuana in his backyard. 185 In response to the report, an officer
attempted to make ground level verification of the tip.'8 6
180. The court concluded that a search had occurred. Id. at 1369. Additionally, this
search had been conducted without a warrant. Id. at 1357. The court recognized that Dow
had an actual expectation of privacy based on its property ownership. Id. at 1366. The court
recognized that the elaborate ground level security program exhibited a subjective intent by
Dow to be free of overhead observation. Id. at 1364-65. The district court also recognized
that magnification of piping connecting buildings within the facility revealed the internal re-
gions of the plant. Id. at 1365. The use of the term interior is understood to mean open air but
encircled by other buildings so as to make the piping concealed from ground level sighting
from the perimeter of the facility. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 310 (6th
Cir. 1984). The district court did not believe that Dow should be required to enclose its plant
to maintain its privacy. Dow Chemical, 536 F. Supp. at 1365. Moreover, the court recognized
Dow's expectation of privacy as reasonable. Id. at 1369. Relying on precedent with regard to
precautions required to prevent industrial espionage, E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Chris-
topher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971), the court
refused to require businesses to enclose their facilities to prevent government observation. Dow
Chemical, 536 F. Supp. at 1366-67. The court also objected to the use of a camera capable of
revealing greater detail than apparent to the naked eye. Id. at 1367. Consistent with its view
that the piping revealed by the photographs was interior detail despite its open air status, the
court held that enhanced senses intruded upon the plant in violation of the fourth amendment.
Id. at 1367-68. In light of potential technological developments, the court suggested that the
reasonable expectation of privacy existing at ground level should have vertical extension into
the skies. Id. at 1368-69.
181. Dow Chemical, 749 F.2d 307, 315. The court of appeals distinguished an actual ex-
pectation of privacy from ground level invasions from aerial intrusions. Id. at 312. Of signifi-
cance to the court was the plant's proximity to an airport which exposed it to frequent
overflights by the public. Id. at 312. Unlike the district court, the court of appeals felt that
covering exposed piping was a practical precaution available to the petitioner. Id. at 312-13.
Secondly, the court did not find the asserted expectation of privacy legitimate. Id. at 313.
Characterizing the facility as an open field, the court found no fourth amendment protections
attached to such property. Id. The court rejected Dow's argument that the facility resembled
curtilage and received protections similar to those applied to the area surrounding a home. Id.
at 313-14. Finally, the court clarified the factual setting of the case as related to the issue of
enhancement of the senses. Id. at 314-15. Protection of the interior of a structure meant that
which was not outdoors. Id. at 315. Since the piping revealed by photographs was outdoors, it
was susceptible to viewing with the slightly enhanced vision provided by a mapping camera.
Id. at 315.
182. See Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1827 (1986).
183. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
184. Id. at 1811-13.
185. Id. at 1810.
186. Id.
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The police were unable to verify the charge because Ciraolo erected one
six-foot and one ten-foot fence around his yard.' 8 7 The police flew over the
neighborhood in a private plane and observed marijuana plants eight to ten
feet tall in Ciraolo's yard.' They photographed the plants and attached the
photographs to an affidavit requesting issuance of a search warrant.' 89 The
trial court approved the search warrant 9 ° and admitted as evidence the
plants seized in the ensuing search.' 9 ' The California Court of Appeals re-
versed.' 92 The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's admission of the
evidence based on its finding that no search had taken place under the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test.' 9
A. Katz Prong One: Ground Level Precautions Do Not Manifest an
Intent to Prevent Aerial Observation
The first prong of the Katz test requires that the party seeking to suppress
evidence establish that he objectively manifested an intent to maintain his
privacy.' 94 In Dow Chemical the Court examined the precautions taken and
found them inadequate to prevent aerial surveillance. 95 The Court noted
that while Dow had taken elaborate steps to prevent ground level viewing of
its complex, it had made no effort to prevent observation from the air despite
its location beneath departure and arrival flight patterns at a nearby com-
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1810-11.
190. Id. at 1811.
191. Id.
192. People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1090, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 98 (Dist. Ct. App.
1984). The court first rejected application of the United States v. Leon good faith exception to
the warrant requirement, because it does not apply to warrantless searches. 161 Cal. App. 3d
at 1086, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984)). Thus,
the court dealt with the issue of search under the Katz test. Id. at 1088, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 96-
98. With regard to the first Katz prong, the court recognized Ciraolo's actual expectation of
privacy based on his erecting of fences around his yard. Id. at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97. The
court objected to a standard requiring erection of an "opaque bubble" to protect privacy. Id.
at 1090, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 98 (quoting United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir.
1980)). Evaluating the second prong, the court differentiated aerial surveillance of curtilage
from open fields since curtilage involved the same values as the home. Id. at 1089-90, 208 Cal.
Rptr. at 96. Thus, the court found reasonable an expectation of privacy in curtilage sur-
rounded by fences. Id. at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
193. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1813 (1986).
194. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 196-97, 199 and accompanying text. The government in Dow Chemi-
cal conceded that it had conducted a search. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F.
Supp. 1355, 1358 (E.D. Mich. 1982). The state in Ciraolo did not appeal the appellate court
finding that Ciraolo had an expectation of privacy. Ciraol, 106 S. Ct. at 1811-12.
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mercial airport. 196 The Court concluded that the contrast of extensive and
nonexistent measures to prevent different types of observation implied no
particularized expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance. 97 In con-
trast, the dissent expressed the view that ground level precautions implied a
general intent to be free of all forms of surveillance. 98
In Ciraolo, the Court tested Dante Ciraolo's efforts to maintain his pri-
vacy based on their efficacy in preventing aerial observation. 99 Addition-
ally, the Court rejected Ciraolo's argument that precautions against "casual,
accidental observation" sufficed to prevent focused police observations. 2°°
The consequence of an ineffective precautionary measure was the knowing
exposure of the activity to the public. 21  The dissent responded that the
public seldom observes from commercial airplanes the activities of particular
persons residing below.20 2 The Court found such a distinction unimportant
in as much as the police had seen no more than the public could have from
the same vantage point20 3 and prior case law had established that police
were free to survey "from a public vantage point ... activities clearly visi-
ble. ' ' 2 ' Thus, the Court in Dow Chemical and Ciraolo rejected arguments of
196. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1826 n.4 (1986) (quoting Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1984)).
197. Id. at 1826 n.4 (quoting Dow Chemical, 749 F.2d at 312).
198. Id. at 1828 (Powell, J., dissenting). In support of this generalized intent, the dissent
emphasized that aerial precautions of the type the Court required would be prohibitively un-
safe, expensive and impractical. Id. at 1828 & nn. 1-2 & 7. The Court admitted the impractica-
bility of enclosing an industrial plant but offered no advice as to alternative precautions Dow
might have taken. Id. at 1825 (opinion by Burger, C.J.). Dow's practice of following up low
level flights did not prevent surveillance since it acted post facto. Id. at 1826 n.4.
199. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1811-12 (1986) (opinion by Burger, C.J.).
200. Id. at 1812.
The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require
law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thor-
oughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict
some views of his activities preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage
point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible. Eg.,
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).
Id.
201. Id. at 1812 (quoting United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
202. Id. at 1818 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent also criticized the decision in
Ciraolo because the Court did not distinguish the purposes for which police and the public use
public airways. Id. at 1818. The dissent attempted to distinguish the ability of officers to view
activities in streets in which all citizens may view the conduct of others from their ability to
view activities from public air space in which the risk of citizen's observation of private activi-
ties below them is remote. Id. at 1818-19.
203. The Court applied the conclusion in Katz that what is visible to the public may be
observed by the government. Id. at 1812-13 (opinion by Burger, C.J.) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S.
at 351).
204. Id. at 1812 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282).
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an objective manifestation of privacy intent where the precautions under-
taken were not specific to the mode of surveillance used by the government.
B. Katz Prong Two: Aerial Surveillance Does Not Compromise a
Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Open Fields or Curtilage
The second prong of the Katz test requires that the target of the search's
expectation of privacy be reasonable.2 °5 The Supreme Court in Dow Chemi-
cal and Ciraolo focused primarily on this second aspect of the Katz definition
of search.2" 6 The cases also elaborated on several fourth amendment issues
concerning sensory enhancement as related to the second prong of the Katz
test.207
The Dow Chemical Court refused to extend to the exterior of a commer-
cial building the privacy interests the Framers recognized in the interior of
such a building but admitted that the area had characteristics of both curti-
lage and open fields.20 8 The dissent made no distinction between the exterior
and "interior portion[s]" of commercial property because it defined as inte-
rior what lay within the perimeter of the surrounding fence and buildings.20 9
Similarly, the Court refused to extend to the curtilage of a residence the full
privacy interests the Framers had guarded within the home.2 0 The dissent
205. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
206. The Court focused on the second Katz prong because the government and police had
not protested the actual expectation of privacy of the targets under the first prong of the test.
See supra note 195.
207. The ancillary issue raised related to the reasonability of use of cameras in aerial sur-
veillance. In Dow Chemical, the Court addressed the issue of whether use of a precision cam-
era in a mixed curtilage/open field area unreasonably intruded on a business's privacy. Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1826 (1986) (opinion by Burger, C.J.). The
Court found that the camera revealed no uniquely available information. Id. at 1826-27. The
dissent objected that the photographs could be magnified to reveal minute details. Id. at 1829
(Powell, J., dissenting). The Court responded that EPA had not magnified them, making the
intrusion potential, not actual. Id. at 1826-27 & n.5 (opinion by Burger, C.J.) (quoting United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 605, 712 (1984)). They, therefore, revealed little more than what was
visible to the naked eye. Id. at 1827. Ciraolo also upheld naked eye observation of curtilage
and avoided the issue of use of a camera despite the fact that police officers had also photo-
graphed Ciraolos' yard with a 35mm camera. 106 S. Ct. 1811, 1813 (1986). The dissent ar-
gued that permitting use of airplanes would lead to steady increases in the intrusiveness of
surveillance. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1833 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Court stated
it would draw the line at the more intrusive devices but not at airplanes and mapping cameras.
See id. at 1826-27 (opinion by Burger, C.J.); see also California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809,
1813 (1986) (opinion by Burger, C.J.). The cases leave unanswered the question of whether it
is permissible under the fourth amendment to use a sight enhancing camera to observe activi-
ties within the curtilage of a home. Lower courts have not permitted use of sense enhancing
devices to observe activities within a home. See supra note 11.
208. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1825-26.
209. Id. at 1828 (Powell, J., dissenting).
210. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812 (opinion by Burger, C.J.).
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would have equated the protections of the home with those of the curtilage
since intimate activities the Framers intended to protect could take place in
both areas. 2 ' The decisions clarified the conclusion that as individuals
move further afield, the reasonableness of privacy expectations decreases.21 2
The Court also refused to find strong societal interests in the privacy inter-
ests asserted by businesses based on trade secret law21 3 and the fifth amend-
ment.214 Dow had argued that trade secret laws were one of the societal
understandings that justified an expectation of privacy from government
photography of its facility.215 The Court rejected this analysis because state
trade secret laws, like state trespass laws, were property rather than privacy
216protections. The dissent responded by pointing to prior reasoning of the
Court which stated that Katz had not erased all property concepts from con-
sideration when weighing the legitimacy of privacy interests.217 Both opin-
ions made selective use of property analysis without explaining the
appropriate limits of such concepts in fourth amendment doctrine.218
The Court based its holding, that Dow's expectation of privacy was unrea-
sonable, on the finding that the exterior portions of a commercial facility
have characteristics of both curtilage and open fields 21 9 but are unprotected
211. See id. at 1816-17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
212. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
213. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1823 (opinion by Burger, C.J.).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. Katz had rejected property concepts as the basis for fourth amendment protec-
tions. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. But see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144
n. 14 (1978) (The Court admitted that the Katz definition did not entirely dispense with prop-
erty concepts in evaluating the reasonableness of expectations of privacy). Additionally, trade
secret law has as its purpose the prevention of unfair competition. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at
1823 (opinion by Burger, C.J.). Since the government did not take photographs with the intent
of competing with Dow, the fourth amendment does not proscribe its conduct. Id.
217. Id. at 1832 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n. 12). Thus the
dissent found general support in trade secret laws of the privacy values inhering in a com-
pany's technological property. Id. The dissent's conclusion in this area conflicts with its ob-
servation elsewhere that the majority opinion had resurrected property concepts, contrary to
Katz when it upheld aerial surveillance because it had been conducted without a physical en-
try. Id. at 1831-32. The dissent admitted that the fourth amendment protected against inva-
sion of privacy, not property, in order to respond to the Court's vantage point analysis, id., but
also argued that privacy interests attach to certain property based on common law precepts.
Id. at 1832 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12).
218. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. The majority opinion rejected trade
secrets law as a basis for fourth amendment protection comparing it with trespass law since
both have roots in property law. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1823 (opinion by Burger, C.J.)
(citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984)). However, the Court distinguished
ground search from aerial surveillance since the latter takes place "without physical entry."
Id. at 1826 (emphasis in original).
219. Id. at 1825-26.
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from government aerial observation. 220 The Court rejected Dow's argument
that "industrial curtilage" deserved the enhanced protections afforded the
curtilage of a home.221 This distinction derived from the differences between
the nature of activities undertaken in the two types of areas.222 Since the
Court admitted that ground level observance of the Dow plant would have
been a search under the Katz test,22 a it distinguished the outcome of aerial
surveillance under the Katz test based on the analysis that the same property
could have more characteristics of curtilage when examined at ground level
than when examined aerially. 224 The significance of this distinction was that
the EPA had been able to observe the Dow plant from above "without physi-
cal entry.",225 The dissent labeled this reasoning a contradiction of Katz
"[s]ince physical trespass no longer functions as a reliable proxy for intru-
sion on privacy. "226 This analysis contradicted the dissent's attempt to res-
urrect property concepts in recognizing privacy interests in trade secrets.227
In contrast, the Court's reasoning relied more on the weakness of privacy
interests than on property rights.22' Even Dow admitted that the photo-
graphs taken would have been admissible if taken from a nearby hill.229 The
Court upheld the aerial observation as reasonable since the EPA had seen no
more than what was visible to the public from public airways.23°
The Court in Ciraolo rendered irrelevant the distinction in Dow Chemical
between curtilage and open fields when it upheld the aerial surveillance of a
homeowner's backyard.2 3  The Court found unreasonable the notion that
police could not legally view curtilage if they were located in a public place
and the area was visible from that place.232 Although the dissent would
have extended to curtilage the same protections accorded the interior of a
home,2 33 the dissent admitted that historic protection of curtilage depended
on the precautions taken by a resident to conceal his yard "from observation
220. Id. at 1826.
221. Id. (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 (1981)).
222. See id. (citing Donovan, 452 U.S. at 599).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. (emphasis in original).
226. Id. at 1831-32 (Powell, J., dissenting).
227. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
228. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1823 (opinion by Burger, C.J.).
229. Id. at 1824.
230. Id. at 1826-27.
231. If aerial surveillance is not a search in the case of an open field or curtilage, it hardly
matters whether the areas between buildings are open fields or business curtilage when the
government seeks to make a naked eye aerial observation.
232. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1813 (1986) (opinion by Burger, C.J.).
233. Id. at 1816-17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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by people passing by."'2 34 Since the homeowner failed to conceal his yard
from the sight of people flying overhead, the Court held his expectation of
privacy unreasonable.2 35 The dissent also indicated that the reasonableness
of one's privacy interests differed when police observed activities during rou-
tine as opposed to focused overflights.2 36 The Court found no other prece-
dent for distinguishing privacy expectations based on the purpose of the
officer discovering the activity.237
The Court in Dow Chemical and Ciraolo thus found that under both
prongs of the Katz test the government had not violated a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. In the absence of the government having committed a
search, the Court did not require a warrant as a precondition of aerial
surveillance.
III. RECONCILING Dow CHEMICAL AND CIRAOLO WITH KATZ
The debate between the majority and dissenting opinions in Dow Chemical
and Ciraolo focused on whether the Court had retreated from its position in
Katz that the fourth amendment protects the privacy of individuals rather
than of places. 238 Both cases are reconcilable with Katz. Dow Chemical and
Ciraolo focused on the Katz two-prong test and concluded that no legitimate
expectation of privacy existed in an industrial open field or in a homeowner's
backyard.239 Additionally, the cases did not rely on a physical trespass defi-
nition of search but rather looked at numerous factors that relate to pri-
vacy."4 The cases did, however, clarify fourth amendment analysis in the
areas of precautions necessary to indicate an intent to maintain privacy, sat-
isfying the first prong of the Katz test, and the open fields and curtilage
234. Id. at 1817 (citations omitted).
235. Id. at 1813 (opinion by Burger, C.J.).
236. Id. at 1818. But see supra note 200 and accompanying text.
237. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent predicted that the
decision in Ciraolo would force citizens back into their homes to be free from surveillance. Id.
at 1819 n.10. But as the Court noted, an entitlement to privacy in activities society has recog-
nized as private, such as use of a telephone, does not imply a similar entitlement to privacy in
activities society has not considered private, such as growing marijuana. Id. at 1813 (opinion
by Burger, C.J.). The fourth amendment shields legitimately private activities, not criminal
activities. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.13 (1984) (Framers did not mean to
immunize criminal activity where criminals erected fences and "No Trespassing" signs); see
also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
238. The Court recognized the applicability ofKatz, Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811 (opinion by
Burger, C.J.); see Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 (1986) (opinion by
Burger, C.J.), while the dissent contended the holdings were not consistent with Katz Dow
Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1831 (Powell, J., dissenting); Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1814 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
239. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
240. See infra notes 241-302 and accompanying text.
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doctrines as they related to societal understandings of reasonableness in sat-
isfying the second prong of the Katz test.
A. The First Prong of the Katz Test: Requiring Specific Precautions to
Prevent Observation from Legal Vantage Points
The Court in Dow Chemical and Ciraolo clarified the type of precautions
one must take in order to establish an actual expectation of privacy under
the first prong of the Katz test. In finding efforts to prevent ground level
observation insufficient,241 the Court required individuals and businesses to
take precautions specific to the form of observation used by law enforcement
officials.24 2 This requirement is consistent with the Court's observation in
Katz that use of a public phone booth prevented auditory observation but
would not prevent visual observation of the target because the precaution of
shutting a phone booth's door indicated only an intent to prevent others
from overhearing private conversations, not an intent to prevent all forms of
observation.2 43 The Court also indicated in its recent decisions that the pre-
cautions taken must be capable of preventing the particular observation. 2 "
The Court denied businesses and individuals the option of instituting
measures incapable of preventing observation in order to assert an unrealis-
tic expectation. 24 5 This requirement of efficacy of precautions taken was
reminiscent of the Court's position in Rawlings that placing drugs in a purse
to which others had access failed to uphold the assertion of an intent to keep
the material private. 24 6 The Court did not indicate in Dow Chemical and
Ciraolo what precautions would be sufficient to prevent aerial surveillance24 7
and in Dow Chemical recognized that all efforts might be impracticable. 248
Nevertheless, it found no actual expectation of privacy from aerial surveil-
lance when a property owner had merely acted to prevent ground level ob-
servation.249 The dissent's prediction that property owners would be forced
241. See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
243. Katz's shutting of the phone booth door prevented government eavesdropping, not
government visual surveillance. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
244. See supra notes 196-97, 199, and accompanying text.
245. The Court refused to find that the fences preventing ground level observation likewise
prevented aerial observation since they were physically incapable of doing so. Id.
246. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
247. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 (1986) (opinion by Burger,
C.J.). But see 38 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4121, 4124 (1985) (quoting California Deputy Attor-
ney General Lawrence K. Sullivan) (suggesting overhanging trees might prevent observation in
some circumstances).
248. In fact, the Court admitted in Dow Chemical that building a dome would be impracti-
cal. See supra note 198.
249. See supra notes 197, 199 and accompanying text. The alternative to requiring precau-
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back within their buildings to prevent this observation thus seems
justified.250
The Court also clarified the first prong of the Katz test in rejecting the
argument in Ciraolo that aerial surveillance focused on a particular lot con-
stituted search while routine flight resulting in discovery of a crime did
not.25' The Court concluded that the purpose of the officers was irrelevant if
they viewed no more than was visible to the public.252 This conclusion was
consistent with the Katz conclusion that what is knowingly exposed to the
public is not private.2 53 If cashing checks with one's bank,2 54 dialing phone
calls with the assistance of the phone company, 255 and driving one's car
through public streets256 were knowing exposures making one's actions sus-
ceptible to government observation, it was reasonable that activities within
one's fenced yard or plant within the sight of overhead planes was also a
knowing exposure. In none of these circumstances had the initial exposure
been inadvertently directed at the government.25 7 They did not involve call-
tions which would effectively protect a zone of privacy around homes and businesses would be
to order police to shield their eyes when passing such areas to prevent inadvertent unreasona-
ble search. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812 (opinion by Burger, C.J.); see Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct.
at 1826 (opinion by Burger, C.J.).
This places on the law enforcement officer a burden distinctly different from the burden not
to enter a home without a search warrant. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. In-
structing an officer not to peek through a hole in a fence or hedge nor peer into a yard from a
nearby hill or a consenting neighbor's second story window significantly limits investigatory
powers. Society places the burden on the one who seeks to protect his privacy to do so by
preventing observation of his activities. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. If the dis-
sent had prevailed in waiving the requirement that one prevent aerial surveillance in order to
manifest an actual expectation of privacy, that holding might have provided some authority for
the further assertion that homeowners and businesses could take down their fences and shrubs
because government could not peer in from street level at activities located within the physical
boundaries of their property. The dissent does not provide reasoning that explains, on fourth
amendment grounds, why precautions must be taken at ground level but not aerially. The
decisions in Dow Chemical and Ciraolo seem consistent with Katz to the extent that both call
for some action of enclosure to indicate a desire for privacy. It seems unlikely that Katz would
have been protected had he conducted his telephone call in the open air within the hearing of
government agents. See supra notes 100, 106 and accompanying text. His failure to shut the
booth door would have exposed the conversation to the public. See supra note 119 and accom-
panying text.
250. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 106.
254. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
257. In United States v. Miller, the defendant negotiated his checks with the bank. The
government obtained the documents only after issuing a subpoena to the bank for them. See
supra note 121. In Smith v. Maryland, the defendant dialed his calls with the aid of the phone
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ing attention to the activity. Each involved ordinary undertakings within
our society. Concentration on the lack of an element of deliberation or in-
tention25 to expose activities to surveillance is therefore misplaced.
Finally, the Court elaborated on the first prong of the Katz test by requir-
ing that precautions be sufficient to prevent observation by officers from a
legal vantage point. Presumably, observation from an illegitimate vantage
point constitutes a search while observation from a legitimate vantage point
does not.2 59 The decisions in Dow Chemical and Ciraolo did not detail a
variety of legal vantage points. Instead, they concluded that public airspace
was legitimate2 ° while warrantless physical entry was not.261 The dissent
criticized this as a return to the physical trespass doctrine under the fourth
amendment.262 Instead, the Court lessened the burden on the target of a
search of displaying an intent to maintain his privacy. A businessman need
not erect barriers to prevent officers from walking into areas not open to the
public. Neither must he build a dome to prevent overhead observation if he
could achieve the same concealment by erecting an awning or planting tall
shade trees.263 The vantage point of a police officer dangling from a helicop-
ter several hundred feet above the ground in order to make plain view obser-
vation of the subject's activities would approximate an entry in that it
circumvents the target's efforts at concealment. 264 An illegitimate vantage
company. The numbers were recorded only because the police had installed a pen register
based on their prior suspicion of wrongdoing. See supra note 123. In Rawlings v. Kentucky,
the defendant exposed his cache of drugs to his companion and possibly her friend. It was
discovered by the police incident to the arrest of another. See supra note 130 and accompany-
ing text. In each of these cases, the seizure of evidence followed a focused observation of the
items by investigators.
258. The dissent in Ciraolo would permit observation made during a routine but not a
focused surveillance. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1818 (1986) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
259. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
263. Cf supra note 247 and accompanying text.
264. Evading a legitimate precautionary measure would seem to be a physically intrusive
manner of surveillance as it resembles entering the nonpublic areas of a commercial building
and would veer from the public airways from which the public are similarly able to view
exterior areas. See supra notes 161, 203 and accompanying text; see, e.g., People v. Sabo, 185
Cal. App. 3d 845, 230 Cal. Rptr 170 (Ct. App. 1986) (low altitude helicopter viewing of inte-
rior of greenhouse in backyard through missing slats distinguished from flight in Ciraolo);
National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal.
1985) (court ordered agency and law enforcment personnel to desist from flying helicopters at
altitudes below public airspace within curtilage of homes as such activities had become so
invasive of privacy as to constitute a search); see also 38 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4121, 4124
(1985) (quoting California Deputy Attorney General Lawrence K. Sullivan) (suggesting that
low flights might be a search). But see United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.
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point should not be permitted to frustrate a legitimate effort at objectively
manifesting an intent to maintain privacy.2 6
Thus, the decisions in Dow Chemical and Ciraolo provided clarification of
the Katz test's first prong without undermining its focus on the protection of
privacy rather than property rights.
B. The Second Prong of the Katz Test: Depending Not on Property
Formulas but on Normative Analysis of the Circumstances
The Katz formulation of search requires that the target's expectation of
privacy be reasonable based on the intent of the Framers and societal affirm-
26ance of the expectation. 66 In evaluating the reasonableness of an individ-
ual's privacy interests, the Court has also considered traditional
presumptions that certain areas are private.267  After Dow Chemical and
Ciraolo, it seems that citizens cannot rely on traditional formulas in deter-
mining whether their activities are private. The reforms begun in Katz will
continue through a process of situational analysis of societal norms.
The Founding Fathers recognized as private homes, "papers, and ef-
fects."'2 68 By inference, courts have concluded that there are historically rec-
ognized privacy interests in business property as well. 269  After Dow
Chemical and Ciraolo it is not possible to infer that the same historical pro-
tections exist in the areas immediately surrounding homes and businesses.2 7
The Court differentiated the privacy interests protected in the interior of a
building from those in the exterior areas.2 7" ' Additionally, the Court con-
cluded that the interior of an industrial complex under aerial surveillance is
the interior of its structures, not the areas concealed from ground level pe-
1986) (use of airplane maneuvers at 1000 feet to view interior of opaque greenhouse is not a
search).
265. An analogy can be drawn here to the "plain view" exception to the warrant require-
ment. See generally 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 88 (1973). The plain view excep-
tion permits officers conducting a legitimate search to seize objects not mentioned in the
warrant if they are inadvertently discovered. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971). The doctrine's origins recognize that "once police are lawfully in a position to
observe an item firsthand, its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost; the owner may retain
the incidents of title and possession but not privacy." Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771
(1983). Thus, courts would suppress evidence seized due to inadvertent discovery during an
illegitimate search. See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 432 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. 1968) (discovery of
evidence in front yard invalid seizure for failure of warrant to specify area to be searched).
266. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 142-58 and accompanying text.
268. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
269. See supra notes 17, 36, 38, 139 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
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rimeter observation.272
The historic protections afforded to the interiors of homes and businesses
are not based on property law concepts but on recognition of privacy inter-
ests. 3 Activities within the "public" areas of a business may not be recog-
nized as private since they are observable by the public, and government
investigators are free to observe what is visible to the public.2 74 Similarly,
the Court in Katz noted that activities revealed to the public may be observa-
ble even though undertaken in the home.275 It is unreasonable to assume
that all activities undertaken on residential or commercial property are pre-
sumptively private.276 Recognition of a privacy interest depends on the cir-
cumstances.277 Generally, the privacy interest diminishes as public access to
the area increases. 278 The increased access of the public weakens the rela-
tionship of historically protected values with the location.279
The most significant input in evaluating the reasonableness of one's expec-
tation of privacy is modern society's affirmance of the asserted privacy inter-
est. Society does not derive its understanding of privacy from property law
concepts but from the relationship of the privacy interest asserted with the
values protected by the fourth amendment.280 In the absence of such a
linkage, the government's interest in detecting crime may outweigh the tar-
get's privacy interest. 28  For example, in Dow Chemical the Court rejected
Dow's argument that it had a reasonable privacy interest in its layout and
design based on trade secret law.282 The Court reasoned that trade secret
laws protected firms from unfair competition.28 3 Since the government did
not intend to compete with Dow, its layout and design were not values pro-
tected by the fourth amendment.28 4 Similarly, the Court in prior cases has
reasoned that property trespass laws protect property owners from the dam-
aging intrusion of strangers.28 5 Since the government entered without the
272. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 150, 203 and accompanying text. But see Recznik v. Lorain, 393 U.S.
166 (1968) (areas in business establishments do not become public merely because people
gather there and thus may not be observable by government investigators).
275. See supra note 106.
276. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 212, 274 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 230, 233-35 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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intent to damage property, a trespass without an intrusion of privacy did
not implicate fourth amendment values.2" 6 However, as noted in Katz an
intrusion of privacy may take place without a physical trespass. 287 Such an
intrusion would compromise privacy interests protected by the fourth
amendment.288 Protection of Katz's privacy in using a phone booth did not
stem from an ownership right in the booth or phone line but from traditional
recognition of the privacy of communication.28 9 The Court in Katz had rec-
ognized that the values safeguarded by the protection of personal papers
were the same values safeguarded by limiting governmental listening to tele-
phone communication.29° Justification of a privacy interest requires a con-
vergence of the values protected by the fourth amendment with the privacy
norms of modern society.29'
The Court in Dow Chemical did not find such a convergence of fourth
amendment values and modem privacy norms in the open spaces between
buildings at the Dow plant.292 As a result, the Court classified these areas as
combined curtilage/open fields.29' This classification categorically denied
the protection of Dow's expectation of privacy since no expectation of pri-
vacy is legitimate in an open field.294 The novel aspect of the decision in
Dow Chemical is that it admitted that the reasonableness of privacy interests
can vary based on the type of search undertaken. 295 The areas between
Dow's buildings implicated fourth amendment values if the government
sought a ground level but not an aerial inspection.296 Prior case law has
recognized, without highlighting, such distinctions.297
Ciraolo further refined this concept of privacy interests varying with the
mode of observation undertaken. Although modern societal understandings
have previously recognized that the same fourth amendment values pro-
tected in a home are in the curtilage surrounding a home,298 the Court in
Ciraolo held that the expectation of privacy one has in his backyard is unrea-
sonable when the government chooses to fly overhead. 29 9 The decision im-
286. Id.
287. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
290. Id.
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292. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
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295. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
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299. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1812 (1986) (opinion by Burger, C.J.).
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plied that the failure of a homeowner to conceal his activities from
observation affects the reasonableness of his expectations that activities un-
dertaken are private.a° In the absence of an effort to conceal activities in
one's backyard, the linkage between the values protected by the fourth
amendment and modem privacy norms is weakened.30 1 Curtilage and open
fields may both be aerially surveyed under such circumstances without call-
ing into effect the protections of the fourth amendment. 3 2 The legitimacy of
privacy interests under the second prong of the Katz test depends on a nor-
mative analysis of the circumstances including the mode of observation, the
target's efforts at concealment, and the vantage point of the government.
This process of normative analysis replaces previous reliance on the tradi-
tional presumptions of the constitutionally protected areas doctrine continu-
ing the reforms of the doctrine begun in Katz.
Thus, the decisions in Dow Chemical and Ciraolo refine our understanding
of fourth amendment protections without undermining the declaration in
Katz that the fourth amendment protects privacy rather than property.
IV. CONCLUSION
The resolution of the question whether aerial surveillance constitutes a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment provides important re-
inforcement of the Katz legitimate expectation of privacy definition of
search. The Supreme Court has not returned to the physical trespass doc-
trine which proscribed only those investigations made possible by physical
entry of a protected area. The Court continues to focus on protection of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Furthermore, the decisions in Dow
Chemical and Ciraolo highlight the requirement that one who wishes to pro-
tect his privacy must have exhibited that intention by erecting barriers
preventing observation of his activities. Barriers preventing ground level ob-
servation may prove inadequate to prevent aerial surveillance; they also do
not display an actual expectation of privacy from such observations. Thus,
the Dow Chemical and Ciraolo cases conclude that knowing exposure of ac-
tivities or things to observation does not require deliberation or intention to
display on the part of the target of the search.
The cases also add to fourth amendment analysis the consideration of the
factor of the observer's legitimate presence at the site of his observation.
This is reminiscent of the discredited physical trespass formula for defining
search, but it is not strictly a trespass concern. The decisions provide impor-
300. See id.
301. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
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tant clarification of the distinction between curtilage and open fields in addi-
tion to recognizing that some areas may fall between the two categories.
Significantly, the cases permit aerial surveillance of curtilage and mixed cur-
tilage/open fields areas without a search warrant despite the traditional view
of curtilage as an extension of the constitutionally protected area of the
home. This tends to confirm that fourth amendment protections decrease as
individuals move outside their homes. The cases also recognize a limited
ability to enhance the use of senses to observe mixed curtilage/open fields
areas while reserving the issue of limiting an observer to his natural senses
elsewhere. When the Supreme Court addresses the issue of magnification in
observing curtilage, the differences between curtilage and open fields may
once again be distinct. It cannot be said that the airplane is an encroaching
device revealing what is concealed. An airplane is merely a device providing
a convenient vantage point for observing that which an individual or busi-
ness has failed to conceal. These decisions make it inconvenient and expen-
sive for wrongdoers to conceal their open air activities from aerial
investigation but may also make it impractical for other citizens to enjoy
legitimate, private activities in the open air. Despite this impact on activi-
ties, the decisions reconcile with traditional fourth amendment analysis.
Cheryl Kettler Corrada
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